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November 29, 2006

Should Veronica Mars Carry a Gun?

The show continues to be on an upward trend.

The continued riffs on the vigilantism motif remain one of the show's best, and most morally fascinating, parts. The TelevisionWithoutPity boards (and the consensus of my Veronica-Mars-watching-friends) strongly supports Logan's resort to jailhouse violence.

At any rate, the titular question still stands. Time and again, Veronica Mars charges into the lion's den, and unlike Daniel, she lacks holy invincibility. I don't criticize this choice: I understand that Veronica 1, feels basically invincible when she's in the right, and 2, has an incredible drive to stop imminent wrongdoing. But in every arc finale so far (Lily's murder, the bus crash, the Hearst rapist) she has been physically outmatched. Given that she is not particularly large, not a Buffy-esque martial artist, and insists on going it alone when in grave danger, shouldn't she be armed? Her dad is.

It does seem possible that a gun would merely increase Veronica's foolhardiness (just as airbags may cause reckless driving). On the other hand, it's not clear how much more foolhardy Veronia could really get (it's not as if her lack of physical power deters her from doing stupid things as it stands). Furthermore, it's also possible that getting and learning how to use a gun would have the opposite effect, because it would force her to take slightly more serious the gravity of the physical danger into which she insists on throwing herself.

What do you think?

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Research Agenda

A great quote, asking all the right questions, from Justice Jackson, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (1945):

What is the basis of power in a constituent state of our federation to govern a controversy, when is it exclusive of a like power asserted for another state on the same or some different basis, and when is it entitled to prevail even in the forums of another state? I leave you pretty much at large on this subject, for that is where the decisions leave me. But I could suggest no more engaging intellectual enterprise to which the scholarship of our profession might turn than to try to find the wise answers on constitutional grounds to these questions.

Of course, the problem is that it is not clear to what extent the constitution or any federal statute really does provide "wise answers" to these questions, but if it doesn't, the problem becomes even deeper. And yes, I know about Doug Laycock's attempt to answer these questions in his Colum. L. Rev. article.

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Titles of Nobility

I've finally gotten around to reading Chernow's Alexander Hamilton. It's a good book, made better by the fact it contains an interesting discussion of the "titles of nobility" prohibition in our constitution. To cut a long story short, Chernow tells us that there was some uproar in Hamilton's time as to whether the hereditary Society of the Cincinnati should be made an illegal title of nobility. The way the constitution eventually shook out, of course, it's only state and federal government titles of nobility which are banned, and foreign titles of nobility held by people serving the United States (ยงยง 9 and 10 of Article I). So the Society of the Cincinnati issue was rendered moot, and it's still around today.

Nonetheless, that set me to wondering about titles of nobility, setting aside the extremely convoluted and odd theories about the "lost" 13th amendment. (for an explanation of this new to me issue, see the comprehensive debunking here). What ought to constitute a "title of nobility?"

My sense, without having done much research, is that there are probably two somewhat overlapping categorizations of nobility. Clearly, if someone is granted the right to call himself a "Duke" by Virginia, that's probably violative of the constitution, although just as clearly, not all titles are equally infirm (a Ph.D awarded by a public university, perhaps). And equally clearly, there's probably some level of privilege inaccessible to other citizens that would eventually become a constitutional violation, whatever it was called. I would guess that any hereditary designation would probably fall directly into that zone. So, for example, if Virginia decided to set up a branch of the Baronial Order of Magna Charta, that too would probably violate the constitution.

There are, I note, various tax protestor cases available deciding that "person", "officer of the court", "taxpayer", and various other commonly used, obviously non-noble titles are not constitutionally prohibited "titles of nobility", but I know of no substantial even remotely recent case. Can anyone think of an example where this might come up today?

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Lay Constitutionalism?

David Lat reports on the investiture of Neil Gorsuch, a newly-minted 10th Circuit (hooray!) judge. The report includes this quote from the Denver Post:

Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, who was in Denver to administer the oath, spoke directly to the little girls before Gorsuch raised his right hand.

"He's doing it to remind all of us that the first obligation any American has is to defend and protect the Constitution of the United States," he said. (emphasis added)

This is fascinating. If this is correct, then the implication is that the oath to the Constitution that the Congress requires of various state and federal officers and office-holders is declaratory of their already-existing duty. It would also imply that a conscientious judge who believes that the Constitution requires him to aid and abet in a practice (slavery, abortion, prohibition of alcohol) that he believes to be grossly immoral can't necessarily obviate the dilemma by resigning from the bench, because even as a lay person they would have an obligation to defend and protect the (subjectively) evil provision.

It would also presumably follow that popular iniatives and referenda ought to receive the same presumption of constitutionality that legislatively-enacted statutes do; the good justification for giving the legislatively-enacted laws a deference that didn't apply to popularly-enacted ones is that legislation has already undergone one layer of constitutional review while initiatives have not. If all lay citizens have an obligation to the Constitution, then presumably lay-laws have undergone just as much constitutional review as legislative ones.

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